What appears on a bank statement as “GEMCEBR LONDON GBR” sounds respectable — almost academic. It echoes the well-known Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR), a legitimate UK institution. But according to newly uncovered intelligence, the descriptor is not tied to any research institute. It is the financial mask of an illegal casino network targeting European players.
At the center of the operation:
• RevDuck
• Lyntec Limited
• A cluster of Curaçao and Costa Rica casino shells
• And the SoftSwiss/Affilka platform infrastructure
This is not affiliate marketing. This is structured transaction laundering.
The Descriptor That Shouldn’t Exist
When Dutch and EU players deposited funds into online casinos like HolyLuck and TrueLuck, their banks did not show gambling payments. Instead, statements displayed:
“GEMCEBR LONDON GBR.”
Compliance systems rely heavily on merchant descriptors. Banks, card schemes, and fraud engines use them to flag high-risk industries such as gambling. The clever manipulation of that descriptor is the first red flag.
The Mask
“CEBR” resembles the respected UK economic research institute.
“London GBR” adds credibility.
“GEM” appears harmless — unless you know what it signals.
The Reality
Investigators now believe “GEM” acts as an internal marker tied to a broader “Jewels” syndicate. Offshore entities such as:
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Sapphire Summit S.R.L.
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Gem Limitada
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Zephyr Holding S.R.L.
appear repeatedly across casino brands linked to RevDuck.
The use of gemstone naming patterns is not branding coincidence. It is operational fingerprinting.
Lyntec Limited: The London Banking Access Point
Follow the money and it leads to Great Portland Street, London — specifically the virtual office ecosystem at 167–169 and 85 Great Portland Street.
There, in August 2024, Lyntec Limited (Company No. 15919943) was incorporated.
Declared business: IT consultancy.
Actual function, according to emerging evidence: merchant-of-record front for illegal gambling deposits.
By registering as an IT services company, Lyntec gains access to UK banking infrastructure. High-risk gambling companies often struggle to obtain stable card processing relationships. But IT consultancies? They are low-risk on paper.
This is textbook transaction laundering:
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Player deposits money into HolyLuck or TrueLuck.
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Bank sees “IT consultancy – London.”
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Payment clears without gambling scrutiny.
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Funds are redirected offshore.
The shell absorbs compliance risk. The casino receives clean capital.
The Ukrainian Operational Core
Company records show Lyntec was controlled by Ukrainian nationals Maksym Buriachenko and Kyrylo Lehkodukh (until November 2025).
Meanwhile, industry sources have consistently described RevDuck’s operational teams as Ukrainian-based and embedded in the SoftSwiss/Affilka environment.
The pattern is difficult to ignore:
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Ukrainian control of “brains” (RevDuck affiliate network).
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Ukrainian control of “wallet” (Lyntec payment façade).
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Shared structural alignment within the SoftSwiss/Affilka ecosystem.
There is no formal public filing linking RevDuck and Lyntec. But illegal networks rarely draft formal partnership disclosures.
Coordination leaves circumstantial fingerprints. And here, the fingerprints align.
The SoftSwiss Layer: Infrastructure Behind the Curtain
RevDuck operates on Affilka, the affiliate management platform developed within the SoftSwiss group.
Affilka provides:
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Tracking
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Revenue attribution
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Reporting dashboards
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Affiliate commission payments
It powers over 100 casino brands.
If RevDuck manages traffic and affiliate funnels, Affilka supplies the tracking backbone. Meanwhile, Lyntec supplies card-processing access. Offshore Costa Rica entities supply licensing arbitrage.
The result is vertical integration:
Traffic → Platform → Payment Front → Offshore Operator
This is not decentralization. It is architectural cohesion.
Regulatory Exposure
The network’s structural cousin, Booms.bet — operated via Sapphire Summit S.R.L. — was fined €840,000 by the Dutch Gambling Authority (KSA) in January 2026 for illegal operations targeting the Netherlands.
TrueLuck shares the same Costa Rican registration entity.
The implication is unavoidable:
The same shell structures continue operating under different branding.
Recycling entities while adjusting domain names and payment fronts is a known tactic in high-risk gambling markets.
Why This Matters
Transaction laundering is not minor regulatory evasion. It is a serious compliance breach that undermines:
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Card scheme rules
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AML monitoring
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Consumer protection frameworks
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National gambling laws
If Lyntec is acting as merchant-of-record for disguised gambling flows, UK financial infrastructure is being used to clean high-risk activity targeting restricted jurisdictions.
That makes this not just a Curaçao problem — but a London problem.
Conclusion
RevDuck’s claim to be “just an affiliate network” collapses under structural analysis.
The jewel-themed offshore entities, the London IT consultancy façade, the GEMCEBR descriptor, and the Affilka-powered backend form a coherent system.
A system designed to:
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Evade bank detection
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Target restricted EU markets
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Launder gambling transactions under neutral descriptors
This is not marketing creativity.
It is financial engineering for regulatory evasion.
